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VARIABLE INTEREST RATES AND
NEGOTIABILITY: CONFLICT AND CRISIS
JANINE S. HILLER*

Commercial paper and the requirements for negotiability are time-honored
concepts. Generally, attorneys, courts, and financial institutions are well versed in
the traditional elements of a negotiable instrument and can easily identify the listed
requirements which qualify an instrument as negotiable under the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC or the Code). However, an emerging body of law casts
doubt on the uniformity of the definition of a negotiable instrument. Moreover, a
controversy stems from the use of variable or adjustable' interest rates and the
resulting question raised concerning the sum certain2 element of negotiability.
Because a sum certain is not defined in the UCC, the question of whether a variable
interest rate satisfies the requirement of a sum certain is the crux of the debate,
The courts are split over this issue. One viewpoint favors predictability while
another promotes flexibility. The legislatures have also been inconsistent. Although
there is a proposed uniform amendment dealing with the issue,3 state statutes
addressing the problem are anything but uniform. This inconsistent treatment of
adjustable rate instruments is wreaking havoc on the ability of federal agencies to
deal with one of the biggest financial fiascos' this country has ever fdced: bank
failures. The questionable negotiability of a bank's assets can compromise the
ability of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), or the ability of the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),4 to effectuate the sale of those financial assets
upon a bank's demise. In addition, non-negotiability costs consumers and businesses
more in interest payments because of the added risk the bank must assume without
being able to confer "holder in due course" status to a buyer of the adjustable rate
paper.' A holder in due course is defined under the Code as one who takes a
negotiable instrument for value, in good faith and without knowledge of a claim or
defense or that the instrument is overdue.6
This article will first discuss the cases and statutes addressing variable interest
rates and negotiability. Trends are identified and analyzed as several of the highest
state courts have recently ruled on the issue, with those states and additional states
consequently enacting relevant statutory amendments. Next, the implications of the
*

Professor of Business Law, R. B. Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and

State University, Blacksburg, Virginia. J.D., 1981, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond; B.A., 1978, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1. In this article, the terms variable and adjustable are used synonymously. They refer to an interest
rate that changes from time to time, depending on a rate that is determined at a future date, not a rate
that can be determined from the face of the instrument.

2. See U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) (1987).
3. U.C.C. § 3-106(2) (Discussion Draft 1987).

4. See infra notes 148-78 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
6. U.C.C. § 3-302 (1987); see also id. § 3-303 (taking for value); id. § 3-304 (notice); id. § 1-201
(good faith).
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debate will be defined and discussed. Emphasis will be placed on the effect this has
on the RTC's ability to recoup a large amount of bank and thrift losses. Lastly,
conclusions are reached regarding the desirability of adjustable interest rate
negotiable instruments. In the 1980s, this issue was only being initially recognized,
while in the 1990s, the ramifications and policies involved are already being hotly
debated. The categorization of variable rate documents as negotiable or nonnegotiable will significantly impact the costs passed on to individual consumers, as
well as determine the finances of the country needed to deal with the monolithic
problem of bank failures.
L HistoricalBackground
A brief history of the law of negotiability is helpful in understanding the present
discussion of statutory construction. Negotiable instruments were first created in
England in the 1660s.7 The common law reflected the negotiability concept in the
Law Merchant Later, the usage and practices in the Law Merchant were codified
in the English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882.? To be negotiable, the instrument was
required to be in writing, signed by the maker or drawer, and to unconditionally
promise to pay a sum certain in money. No particular wording was necessary,"0 as
the English courts held that "[t]he act was made for the advancement of trade, and
ought, therefore, to receive a liberal construction."" Interest was not collectable
unless stated; however, the general provision "bearing interest" was sufficiently
definite without stating a particular rate of interest.12
In the United States, the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) was enacted
unanimously, by the states, by 1924."3 A sum certain was required for the paper
to qualify as negotiable, and an instrument providing for payment "with interest"
was specifically allowed. 4
In contrast to the general statement of an undetermined amount of interest
allowed by the NIL, the UCC took no such stance. The UCC was adopted by all
fifty states and is in use today. 5 The Code adopted the basic structure of the NIL,
but added particular provisions to deal with identified problems. 6 It is important
to note that there is no particular definition of a sum certain. However, section 3106(1) was added to address the past problem of changing post-maturity interest

7. See WILLIAM E. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES (1961).
8. See MARK E. RO:sKOwsKI, BUSINESS LAW: PRINCIPLES, CASES AND POLICY 425 (1987).
9. See BRADFORD STONE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN A NUTSHELL 1, 168 (3d ed. 1989).
10. See JOHN B. BYLES, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE,
PROMISSORY NOTES, BAN,-NOTES, BANKERS' CASH-NOTES, AND CHECKS 4 (1837).

11. Id.
12. Id. at 231.
13. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT (1986); see
JENNINGS, LAW FOR BuSINESS 668 (2d ed. 1991).

BRUCE

E.

FISHER & MARIANNE

M.

14. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT § 2(3).
15. See FISHER & JENNINGS, supra note 13, at 668.

16. This approach is criticized in Larry Lawrence, Misconceptions About Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Suggested Methodology and ProposedRevisions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 115 (1983).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss2/5

1993]

INTEREST RATES & NEGOTIABILITY

rates. It allows a negotiable instrument to be payable "(a) with stated interest or by
stated installments; or (b) with stated different rates of interest before and after
default or a specified date.""7 The added verbiage "stated interest" seems to be a
significant departure from the more flexible position taken by the NIL in the phrase
"with interest."" It also varies from the liberal construction accorded interest
payments under the Law Merchant. The comments to section 3-106 specifically
state: "The computation [of the payment] must be one which can be made from the
instrument itself without reference to any outside source, and this section does not
make negotiable a note payable with interest 'at the current rate.""... These
comments have been cited often by courts deciding the negotiability of variable
rates that cannot be ascertained by reference only to the four corners of the
document.'
Courts also find relevant section 1-102, which states in relevant part:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
The comments to this section explain that
[t]his Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to
be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own
machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to
make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by
the courts in the light of the unforseen and new circumstances and
practices.'
Thus, the debate has been drawn; uniformity and the specific four corners limitation
in the comment to section 3-106 have been balanced against the policy of expanded
commercial practice and flexibility expressed in section 1-102 and its comments.

17. U.C.C. § 3-106(t)(a) & (b) (1987). The remainder of § 3-106 allows a negotiable instrument
to be payable "(c) with a stated discount or addition if paid before or after the date fixed for payment;
or (d) with exchange or less exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at a current rate; or (e) with costs of
collection or an attorney's fee or both upon default." Id. § 3-106(l)(c)-(e). The section further states,
"Nothing in this section shall validate any term which is otherwise illegal." Id. § 3-106(2).
18. See generally Janine S. Hiller, Negotiabilityand Variable Interest Rates, 90 CoM. L.J. 277,278
(1985).
19. U.C.C. § 3-106 cmt. 1 (1987).
20. But see id. § 3-118(d) (stating that a provision simply for "interest" means the judgment rate of
interest, which must be determined from an outside source).
21. Id. § 1-102(l)-(2).
22. Id. § 1-102 cmt. I.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:257

As the language and intent of the Code is debated, variable interest rate
instruments continue to be utilized in great numbers. Variable rate loans represented
60% of the total loans made in 1984.' In 1990, the majority of loans continued
to include adjustable interest rates2 The benefits of adjustable interest rates accrue
to both the borrower and lender. Borrowers are protected in times of declining
interest rates and can obtain a lower rate even when rates are high. Banks can offer
better adjustable rates because they do not need to hedge against inflation, and are

protected because the rate will increase if the market conditions change.' In times
of high interest rates, the variable rate promotes more affordable rates for consumers
and businesses.' In short, variable rate instruments have become a permanent
financial vehicle. The courts and legislatures should carefully consider the economic
impact that their treatment of adjustable rate paper will create.
I. The Early Case Law
Prior to the 1980s, no case directly ruled on the effect of variable rates on
negotiability. Several cases held that interest at the legal, maximum rate did not

effect negotiability." Such rates were not variable, even though they required
reference to an outside source. In addition, one court held that a variable interest

rate did not render the negotiable interest too indefinite for enforcement between the
parties, although it did not address the sum certain ramifications."
However, during the 1980s, several courts directly analyzed the effect of variable
interest rates on negotiability. At first, the majority of courts decided that variable
interest provisions rendered the instruments nonnegotiable." However, within a
short time period, three of these cases were reversed to allow for negotiability of
variable rate instruments." By the end of the decade, eight state laws had been
drawn into question. The law was divided; Georgia, Illinois, and New York viewed

23. Adjustable Rate Home Mortgages Defended by S&L Organization, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEws, Aug. 30, 1984, at B-10 (containing government estimates for that year).
24. See Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. 1992) (citing Federal
Reserve statistics of 1990.
25. See Janine S. Hiller & Stephen P. Fenis, Mortgage Loan Costs: The Impact of Variable Interest
Rates and Negotiability, 18 REAL EST. L.J. 259, 268-72 (1990) (describing real estate mortgage market
and notes fluctuations in percentage of variable rate mortgages).
26. See Janine S. Hiller & Stephen P. Ferris, Variable Interest Rates and Negotiability:A Response,
94 COM. L. 48, 54-56 (1989) (analyzing economic benefits of variable rate instruments).
27. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964); A. Alport & Son Inc.
v. Hotel Evans, 317 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1970); Woodhouse, Drake & Carey Ltd. v. Anderson, 307 N.Y.S.2d
113 (1970).
28. See Constitution Bank & Trust Co. v. Robinson, 425 A.2d 1268 (Conn. 1979).
29. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Tegtmeier, 673 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Northern
Trust Co. v. E.T. Clancy Export Corp., 612 F. Supp. 712 (E.D, Ill. 1985); Centerre Bank v. Campbell,
744 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Arena, 481 A.2d 1064 (Vt. 1984);
Taylor v. Roeder, 360 S.E.2d 191 (Va. 1987); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Gray, 775 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.
1989). But see McIntosh v. McClenden, 290 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. App. 1982).
30. See First City Fed. Say. Bank v. Bhogaonker, 715 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Klehm v.
Grecian Chalet Ltd., 518 N.E.2d 187 (III. App. 1987).
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variable interest rate instruments as negotiable, while Vermont, Virginia, Texas,
Oklahoma, and Missouri held that variable rates destroy negotiability."
In 1982, Georgia became the first state to address negotiability in McIntosh v.
McClendon. 2 In a cursory opinion, void of supporting rationale, the court held that
a holder in due course would prevail, even when the interest rate was tied to a
fluctuating prime rate.33 By inference, the variable rate satisfied the sum certain
requirement.
The Vermont Supreme Court was the first court to specifically hold that the sum
certain requirement could not be met by a variable interest rate.' The court
emphasized that the amount due must be determined by looking to the document
itself, and that reference to an outside rate did not satisfy that requirement. In this
case, a third party was not trying to become a holder in due course, but nonnegotiability prevented the maker of the note from arguing the impairment of
collateral defense granted in article 3.35
In Northern Trust Co. v. E. T. Clancy Export Co.,36 a federal district court,
applying Illinois law followed the non-negotiability route. Northern Trust involved
an export arrangement whose financing involved a bank's purchase of the buyer's
note, endorsed by the seller. The note provided for interest at 0.5% over the bank's
prime rate. When the buyer defaulted, the bank sued the seller on its endorsement.37 The district court focused on the comments in section 3-106 to help
explain the sum certain. The court impliedly equated the comments' example of lack
of a sum certain when interest is payable at the "current rate," with a variable
rate." Additionally, because the bank's rate could not be determined except through
reference to an outside source, it did not meet the comments' description of the
"four corners" test. Thus, the seller could not be held liable under his endorsement,
because the note was non-negotiable.39
The Northern Trust decision was short-lived. In 1987, an Illinois court of appeals
decided that a variable rate note was negotiable. In Klehm v. Grecian Chalet Ltd. ,
the interest rate varied at stated times in accordance with the prime rate published
in the Wall Street Journal. The court dispensed with the issue summarily, stating,
"Clearly, the note states a rate of interest which varies on specified days and
comports with the definition of a sum certain as found in section 3-106(b)."4' No
mention or consideration was given to the fact that the reference to the Wall Street
Journal's prime rate was outside the instrument. In the court's opinion, the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra notes 32-67 and accompanying text.
290 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. App. 1982).
Id.at 159.
Farmer's Prod., 481 A.2d at 1065.
Id.
1985).
612 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. 111.
Id.at712.
Id. at 715.
Id.
App. 1987).
518 N.E.2d 187, 192 (111.
Id.at 192.
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definiteness of the change dates and the source for the rates seemed to satisfy the
Code's certainty requirement.
Later that same year, two other courts reached the opposite result from the clear
result found by the court in Klehm. In Taylor v. Roeder,42 the Virginia Supreme
Court was the first court to provide, through its majority and dissenting opinion, a
comprehensive analysis of the.competing issues and arguments in the variable
interest rate debate. The makers issued a note, secured by a deed of trust, on their
house. When the house later sold, the settlement attorney forwarded the payoff to
the payee bank. Unknown to the makers or the attorney, the payee bank had
transferred the mortgage to a pension fund as collateral. The bank did not forward
the payoff to the pen;ion fund and subsequently went bankrupt.43 The pension fund
sued the makers on the note, and the makers defended because of their payment.
If the fund was a holder in due course, then they could collect, regardless of the
personal defense." Otherwise, the fund could not collect, because there was no
notice of the transfer, or assignment, of a non-negotiable contract 5
The majority opinion analyzed section 3-106 and its comments, concluding that
the drafters of the code did not intend to include variable interest rates within the
definition of the sum certain." In particular, the court found persuasive the
statement in comment 1 that "[t]he computation must be one which can be made
from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source."'47 However, the
court held that the overriding interest in this case was the uniformity and
predictability of the Code. The court realized the extent to which variable interest
rates were used, but found that the "relative predictability of results" was the
"overriding benefit" of the Code. Thus, the court declined to look beyond the
definition and comments of section 3-106.
The dissent focused on its description of the overall purpose of the UCC - to
provide a flexible legislative framework which would be able to accommodate
evolving commercial practices. 9 Because a sum certain is never specifically
defined in the Code, and because of the widespread commercial acceptance of
variable interest rates, the dissent would recognize "custom and usage, as the
commercial market has," and would find for negotiability."' Thus, the two basic
UCC policies, predictability and flexibility, were identified as conflicting values in

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

360 S.E.2d 191 (Va. 1987).
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 193-94.
Id.
Id. at 194.
See supra note 19.
Taylor, 360 S.E.2d at 195.
Id.
Id. at 196. The di:;sent would limit negotiability to variable rates that can be determined readily.
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this case. This basic conflict between policies continues throughout subsequent
cases.
In 1988, a Missouri appellate court cited and followed the Taylor decision. The
court, in Centerre Bank of Branson v. Campbell,5 could have easily avoided the
issue because the note in question called for interest at "bank rates" - a phrase that
would be so indefinite as to be non-negotiable even in those state courts that
recognized negotiability when variable interest rates are readily ascertainable.52
However, the court emphasized the language of the Code and the reference to the
outside source as determining factors for non-negotiability."
Two New York cases present the different sides of the negotiability issue. In
1987, in National Union FireInsurance Co. v. Tegtmier,' the variable interest rate
applied only to the time period subsequent to default. The court correctly found that
negotiability was "irrelevant" after default." However, like the Missouri court, the
court continued to review and adopt the reasoning in Taylor.56
Shortly after National Union, the New York legislature amended section 3-106
to include, as a sum certain, interest rates determined from outside and "readily
ascertainable" sources.' In 1989, the federal district court was once again asked
to decide the impact of a variable interest rate, since the disputed instrument was
signed prior to the legislative amendment. The district court reversed itself,
saying that the National Union decision was "no longer relevant" because of the
intervening amendment." In essence, the court held that its decision was erroneous, because the legislation was enacted to "clarify any confusion" regarding the
negotiability of variable interest rate documents.'
Also in 1989, a federal circuit court denied negotiability to a variable rate
instrument.6 However, this result was overturned in 1991 by an Oklahoma
Supreme Court decision, addressing the same fact situation.62
Finally, cases decided under Texas law in the 1980s and 1990s did little to clarify
the situation, instead causing confusion over the issue in that state. In fact, a
cursory count of cases in both the 1980s and 1990s, including state and federal
decisions, shows two Texas lower appellate court decisions' and seven federal

51. 744 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
52. See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
53. Campbell, 744 S.W.2d at 498.
54. 673 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
55. Id. at 1273.
56. Id.
57. U.C.C. § 3-106(2) (1989).
58. See First City Fed., 715 F. Supp. at 1216.
59. Id. at 1220.
60. Id. at 1219.
61. Doyle v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 869 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1989).
62. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit relied upon the decision of the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals, which was reversed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Doyle, 869 F.2d at
560.
63. See Dillard v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 815 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App. 1991); Lexington Ins. Co.
v. Gray, 775 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App. 1989).
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court decisions denying negotiability, and agreeing to the negative effect of variable
rates on negotiability. 4 One Eighth Circuit case,' applying Texas law, found
variable rates did not destroy negotiability. The number of cases alone implies an
urgency and continuing ambiguity about the question. The issue was finally laid to
rest in 1992 by the Supreme Court of Texas.' Indeed, as in Texas, the trend in the
first years of the 1990s has been to reverse the weight of opinion created in the
1980s.
III, Recent Case Decisions
Within the past two-plus years, courts that addressed the issue of whether variable

rate notes are negotiable were more likely than in previous years to hold that
negotiability remained intact. During 1991 and 1992, six courts decided the issue
and four found in favor of negotiability. The three state courts and one federal court
confirmed variable rates as a sum certain,67 and the two courts reaching the
opposite result were lower federal courts.' The following discussion will explain
these recent cases, beginning with those federal courts that followed in the steps of
Taylor by rejecting adjustable rate as a sum certain.
A. FederalDecisions Against Negotiability
In Chemical Bank v. D3J Associates,6 decided in April 1991, the federal district

court of Maryland denied a motion for summary judgment made by Chemical Bank,
who argued they were entitled to summary judgment because of their holder in due

course status."0 The court reasoned that Chemical Bank was not a holder in due
course because the variable rate in the note rendered it non-negotiable. Therefore,
one cannot be a holder in due course unless the paper is first negotiable. The
district court had to determine Maryland law, whose courts had not yet addressed

64. See Sunbelt Say. v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1991), rev.'d in part sub nmn.
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding the original variable rate
note to be non-negotiable, reversed on procedural grounds so that court took no position); Federal Sav.
& Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 697 (5th Cir. 1991) (following decision in Sunbelt), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163 (1992); Bradford v. American Fed. Bank 783 F. Supp. 283, 285 (N.D. Tex.
1991) (citing Sunbelt, 923 F.2d at 355-57; Lexington, 775 S.W.2d at 682); In re Gas Reclamation
Securities Litigation, 741 F. Supp. 1094, 1102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying Texas law); National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 728 F. Supp. 192, 199-200 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying Texas law); Gibbs v.
Bank One, No. CV.05-90-01562, 1991 WL 174352 (Tex. App. Sept. 5, 1991).
65. See Tanenbaum v. Agri-Capital, Inc., 885 F.2d 464, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Texas
law).
66. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
67. See FDIC v. Hershiser, 777 F. Supp. 539, 542-43 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck,
606 A.2d 389 (N.J. 1992); Goss v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 813 P.2d 492 (Okla. 1991); Amberboy
v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992).
68. See New Conn Bank & Trust v. Stadium Management, 132 B.R. 205 (D. Mass. 1991);
Chemical Bank v. D3J Assoc. Ltd Partnership, No. CIV.A.HAR-90-75, 1991 WL 58049 (D. Md. Apr.
is, 1991).
69. No. CIV.A.HAR-90-75, 1991 WL 58049 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 1991).
70. Id. at *3.
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the effect of variable interest rates on negotiability." The court noted that because
the number of courts favoring non-negotiability outnumbered those favoring
negotiability, it could not "overlook the overwhelming authority" in rendering its
decision.' The court also cited the comment to section 3-106 as supporting
authority.73
The rationale in Chemical Bank is weak. Instead of analyzing the competing
arguments and rendering a decision based on legislative intent, policy reasons,
commercial practices, or statutory interpretation, the court merely pointed to a
number of decisions on one side of the issue. The court could have argued that
consistency is a strong consideration when applying the UCC, and therefore given
deference to the majority viewpoint. However, according to the court's citations,
fewer than ten courts had decided this issue at the time, several of which were lower,
federal district courts. In actuality, seven jurisdictions had almost evenly split along
both sides of the issue at the time of the ChemicalBank decision.74 The state of the
law did not represent the "overwhelming majority" indicated by the court. Because
of its lack of analysis, Chemical Bank does not add significantly to the debate over
the variable interest rate and sum certain requirement.
A few months after Chemical Bank, in July 1991, another federal district court
dispensed with the negotiability argument for adjustable interest rates. In New
Connecticut Bank and Trust v. Stadium Management,75 it was decided that neither
Connecticut nor Massachusetts law would recognize adjustable rates as a sum
certain. 6 New Connecticut Bank and Trust Company (New Connecticut) was the
assignee of almost ten million dollars worth of variable rate notes and guarantees
made by Commonwealth Sports Properties, Inc. (Commonwealth) and the guarantors.
New Connecticut purchased the notes from the FDIC when the original payee,
Connecticut Bank and Trust, was declared insolvent. Commonwealth and the
guarantors admitted they had not made payments on the notes but argued several
defenses to their liability.' The court identified the impairment of collateral defense
as the only one which could have a factual basis and categorized it as a "lender
liability" theory of relief.7 Because the court did not use the UCC impairment of
collateral defense, which had been argued in McIntosh v. McClendon,7 it reached
the opposite result from that early Vermont case. In McIntosh, lack of negotiability
prevented the makers of a note from arguing impairment of collateral." In New

71. Id. The legislature had subsequently passed an amendment to § 3-106 which included variable
rates within a sum certain. However, the court declined to give it retroactive application, or to consider
it a codification of existing law. Id. See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the question of retroactivity.
72. ChemicalBank, 1991 WL 58049 at *3.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
75. 132 B.R. 205 (D. Mass. 1991).
76. Id. at 208 n.4, 209.
77. Id. at 206.
78. Id. at 207.
79. 290 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. App. 1982). See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
80. McIntosh, 290 S.E.2d at 158.
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Connecticut, the district court found that reference to an outside source to determine
the interest rate destroyed negotiability. Although it recognized the change in
commercial usage, the court held that "[t]he primary importance of the Uniform
Commercial Code is the certainty and uniformity which it provides for commercial
transactions. Any deviations from traditional, accepted interpretations of the Code,
should, therefore, come from the legislature and not from the courts."" Since the
note was non-negotible, the FDIC was not a holder in due course, and the claim of
impairment of collateral could be pursued.'
In FDIC v. Hershiser, the court was less concerned with commercial practices
and more concerned with the preservation of the nation's banking system." Through
a bank failure, the ].DIC obtained a variable rate $10,500,000 note that was in
default. The makers alleged certain personal defenses, and the FDIC claimed holder
in due course status. Without referring to any particular state law, the court analyzed
the UCC section and its purpose for the sum certain requirement. It found that
purpose to be the protection of third parties, so they would not be disadvantaged
"thus protecting the commercial value of the note."" The conclusion of the court
was:
Given
court'sinreasons
for providing
FDIC
withasstatus
to
that of the
a holder
due course,
I find that
where,
here,equivalent
the variable
interest rate is tied to a readily ascertainable commercial or financial
index by way of a specific formula such that the interest owed can be
readily calculated, the note does contain a promise to pay a "sum
certain".'
The court seemed to be establishing a federal rule, specifically for application to the
federal takeover of banks,' and adopting the concept of a federal holder in due
course for that circumstance.' Its language, however, was close to that of many of
the state statutes that have been passed to address the issue of the sum certain and
variable interest rates."
B. State Courts
The state court decisions in the 1990s were vastly different from the federal courts.
In Trinity Savings and Loan Association v. Goss,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court
was faced with a variable interest rate note that had allegedly been materially and

81. New Connecticut, 132 B.R. at 209 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 210.
83. 777 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
84. Id. at 542.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 542-43.
87. Id. The court states that its opinion is for "these purposes," thereby limiting the scope of its
application. Id. at 542.
88. The federal holder in due course is discussed infra notes 146-78 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 118-44 and accompanying text.
90. 813 P.2d 492 (Okla. 1991).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss2/5

INTEREST RATES & NEGOTIABILITY

1993]

fraudulently altered. The Gosses financed their home with Trinity Savings and Loan
(Trinity), and executed a note that stated an initial interest rate of 12.5%. The
effective rate was sixteen and one-half percent, but the note featured negative
amortization and graduated payments." Trinity offered the note for sale to the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), but FNMA balked upon realizing
that the effective rate was stated in the note as 12.5%, rather than 16.5%. Trinity
claimed that it obtained a correction initialed by the Gosses, and then sold the note
to FNMA. The Gosses denied signing, or initialing a change and alleged a material
alteration.92
The relevant issue was whether FNMA was a holder in due course, because that
status would allow it to collect on the note as originally drawn.93 The Gosses
argued that FNMA could not be a holder in due course because the variable rate
note did not contain a sum certain for negotiability. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
noted the controversy surrounding the question and the "meritable argument on both
sides." However, it decided to follow the more rational, albeit difficult decision
to hold the variable rate as a sum certain and the note as negotiated. The court
recognized the apparent conflict with its decision and the comment to section 3-106.
However, it emphasized that the comments are unofficial, and that the official text
of section 1-102 declares an intent to "aid in the continued expansion of commercial
practice."" The court addressed the concern that because the rate was only
determinable from an outside source that it would disadvantage a third party by
pointing to the "advent of mass communication facilities offering ready access to
such sources."9 7 Thus, the comment to section 3-106 was largely negated by the
developments of technology.
Therefore, because of the widespread use and acceptance of variable rate notes,
and because of the ease of communicating a change in the rate, the court decided
in favor of negotiability."' As the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
[F]or this court to construe the note as anything other than negotiable
would in our opinion thwart the basic mandate laid down by the drafters
that the code remain flexible and responsive to the business community.
Moreover, we see it as our responsibility to recognize and adopt
established business practices. 9

91. Id. at 493.
92. Id. at 494.
93. Id. at 496; see aLvo U.C.C. § 3-407 (1987).
94. Trinity Say. & Loan, 813 P.2d at 497.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 498.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court also urged legislative adoption of a state draft revision of the Code, which would

allow negotiable instruments to specifically include variable rate instruments. Id. at 499-500. This
amendment was subsequently passed. See infra note 128.
99. Trinity Say. & Loan, 813 P.2d at 499.
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Nearly a year later, in April 1992, the Superior Court of New Jersey agreed with
the rationale in Trinity. The case of Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck"m presented a
complicated series of facts, in which an intermediary financial marketer arranged
financing for Shalleck's company, through the newly formed Carnegie Bank. The
loan was made by Carnegie Bank to the intermediary, who then pledged a
personally guaranteed note and personal mortgage from Shalleck as collateral for
that loan. In short, Shalleck then alleged fraud by the intermediary, and attempted
to use this as a defense to payment on the note that was pledged as collateral.
Carnegie Bank foreclosed on its security, claimed holder in due course status, but
Shalleck argued that his variable rate note was non-negotiable, therefore preventing
Carnegie from attaining holder in due course status.' "' The trial court found that
there was fraud perpetrated against Shalleck by the intermediary, and this defense
could be used against Carnegie because the variable rate note was non-negotiable."
The New Jersey Superior Court reversed the finding of non-negotiability,
following very closely the rationale used in Trinity. First, it noted the lack of a
definition of sum certain in the Code, and the split of opinion in the different
jurisdictions. 3 Although the court agreed that the comment to section 3-106
seemed to require computation of the interest rate without reference to an outside
source, an opposite viewpoint was reflected in specific subsections of section 3-106
which allowed reference to an outside source for exchange rates, collection, and
attorney's fees."' Thus, the court found "the language in the Code itself more
compelling than one of its Comments.""' 5 In addition, the Code reflected a
commitment to flexibility in order to be responsive to evolving commercial
practices, as contained inthe language of section 1-102." The court interpreted
a lack of a definition of sum certain as an invitation by the drafters of the Code to
apply current, accepted commercial practice. Also, the development of variable
interest rates was seen as a positive step to promote the public policy of affordable
home ownership." 7 In conclusion, the New Jersey court held that the sum certain
required "commercial certainty and not mathematical certainty," so as to satisfy
"both the predictability and flexibility contemplated by the Code.""'
The most recent case is Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee,"" decided by
the Supreme Court of Texas in April 1992, within days of the New Jersey

100. 606 A.2d 389 (N.J. 1992).
101. Id. at 391-93. The facts of the case were more complex than the detail given here, but are not
relevant to the reasoning.
102. Id. at 393.
103. Id. at 395-96. New Jersey enacted a revised statute, after the note was signed, including an
adjustable rate in the definition of a sum certain. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
104. Carnegie Bank, 606 A.2d at 398.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 397-98.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 398.
109. 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992)
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opinion."' The Supreme Court of Texas accepted certification of the question of
whether variable interest rates destroy negotiability from the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals."' As the court noted, there is no scarcity of opinion as to the effect of
variable rates in Texas. According to the court, at least three federal district court
cases, apparently applying Texas law, held variable rate notes non-negotiable, and
two cases in the Texas court of appeals ruled the same."' The majority opinion
in Amberboy overruled the conflicting Texas lower court decisions, and indicated
that the federal courts had "guessed" incorrectly concerning Texas law."'
The court began by noting that there was no definition of a sum certain in the
Texas UCC, but that section 3-106 gave exceptions to the basic "four comers"
requirement. Thus, in reference to the requirement that the sum certain be found
within the document, the court said that "the Code itself evidences that this is not
intended to be a rigid, absolute rule."'" 4 Also, the policy of flexibility and
responsiveness to modem commercial practice was reflected in the Code's section
1-102. Variable rates were not used in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Code was
written and adopted. However, variable interest rates began to be used in the 1970s,
and actually dominated in the 1980s. The court recognized that the new development and use of variable rates comports with the Code's "fundamental purpose""'
to reflect business practices. In response, the Texas Supreme Court followed
previous holdings that the certainty required by the Code was commercial certainty
rather than mathematical certainty. Therefore, when variable rates are public, or
"readily available" to the public, the certainty requirement is satisfied, and the
document is negotiable." 6
The dissent began by noting cases, in Texas and elsewhere, that had held variable
rate documents to be non-negotiable. It called these cases the "overwhelming
majority."' It relied heavily on these cases and their interpretation of the Code,
citing Taylor for the proposition that the statutory intent and construction required
strict adherence to the four corners rule except for the enumerated exceptions." '
The dissent did not address the majority's reasoning concerning evolving commercial practices and the overall purpose of the Code.
Thus, the cases deciding the fate of variable rate instruments are divided." 9 The

110. Id.at 793.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 797.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 794.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 797-98.
117. Id. at 801; see also Chemical Bank v. D3J Assoc. Ltd Partnership, No. CIV.A.HAR-90-75,
1991 WL 58049, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 1991) (using, in federal court, the same rationale of
"overwhelming authority" when deciding Maryland law).
118. Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 801-02. The dissent also objected because although the instrument
called for an interest rate determined by the prime rate established by the bank, the bank had never had
its own prime rate. Thus, the interest was not readily ascertainable. Id. at 803.
119. There are two recent state court unpublished opinions that render conflicting conclusions.
Although these unpublished opinions have no precedential value, they do indicate that the conflict is
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statutory amendments to provide for negotiability do little to promote uniformity on
the issue.
IV. Legislation
All of the courts recognized that one of the main benefits of the UCC is,
somewhat obviously, uniformity. For one hundred years, the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and their predecessors have worked towards a unified treatment
of commercial paper by the states." The most recent undertaking involves a
proposed revision of articles 3 and 4, which was offered for adoption by the states
in 1990."' A member of the drafting committee characterized the state of the law
regarding variable interest documents: "[S]omewhere around one-half of the notes
in circulation in this country are governed by rules no one is certain about. That
must be considered as a serious problem."'"
To address that problem, the commissioners proposed changes to two relevant
sections of the Code. First, any reference to a sum certain is deleted. Revised
section 3-104(1) reads: "Negotiable instrument means an unconditional promise or
order to pay a fixed amount of money with or without interest or other charges..
."'' The comment to revised section 3-112 refers to the change and explains that
"[u]nder §3-104(a) the requirement of a 'fixed amount' applies only to principle."' 4
Thus, interest implieily need not be fixed. Added language in section 3-112(b) is
more specific. Specifically, section 3-112(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Interest
may be stated in an instrument as a fixed or variable rate or rates. The amount or
rate of interest may be stated or described in the instrument in any manner and may
require reference to information not contained in the instrument."'" The section
also provides foi interest at the judgement rate if the manner for calculation is
absent.' The official comments describe the result: "Hence, if an instrument calls
for interest, it will always be determinable."'2
The revised Code thus sets out a liberal, unbreakable standard for the payment
of interest. Clearly, the revision does not limit the way that interest can be
described, abrogating the "four corners" requirement. Indeed, it goes further than
almost all of the court decisions, by eliminating any necessity for the interest rate
to be readily ascertainable. The revised Code position arguably "promot[es]

likely to continue. See Johnison v. Johnson, 614 N.E.2d 348 (Il1.App. 1993) (holding that a variable rate
note does not state a sum c,-rtain and is therefore not negotiable); Banchoio National Bank v. Daoud, No.
13399, 1992 WL 371834 (Ohio App. Dec. 21, 1992) (holding that an interest rate that is readily
ascertainable from an outside source states a sum certain, and is therefore negotiable).
120. See Fred H. Miller, The Benefits ofNew U.. C. Articles 3 and 4, 24 U.CC.L.J. 99, 100 (1991).
121. Id. at 102.
122. Id. at 103.
123. U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
124. Id. § 3-112 cmt. 1.
125. Id. § 3-t12(b).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 3-112(b) cmt. I.
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certainty of legal rules and reducies] litigation costs and risks'' by enveloping
any instrument, regardless of how interest is computed. This is contrary to the court
decisions that limited their finding of negotiability to instruments with readily
ascertainable interest rates. 9 It is also contrary to most of the state statutes that
modified their provisions to include variable rates within the definition of a sum
certain. So far, seven states have adopted the revised Code version.'33 Twenty
nevertheless, will recognize the
states have a "non-uniform" amendment which,
3
negotiability of the adjustable rate documents. '
In actuality, fourteen states'32 based their amendment of section 3-106, the sum
certain section, on an earlier discussion draft circulated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The 1987 Discussion Draft amended
section 3-106 by adding a subsection that read:
A rate of interest that cannot be circulated by looking only to the
instrument is "a stated rate of interest" in subsection (1) if the rate is
readily ascertainable by a reference in the instrument to a published
statute, regulation, rule of court, generally accepted commercial or
financial index, compendium of interest rates, or announced rate of a
named financial institution.'33
Even within this group of states, there is little uniformity. For example, several
states add that the rate can be announced "or established,"'' therefore liberalizing
3
the standard for the referenced source. Virginia adds the word "established,1'
without the "or," thereby restricting the definition. Oregon deletes the "readily
ascertainable" standard, thus coming closer to the result under the revised Code.'36
Further deviations from the Discussion Draft section are found that are less substan-

128. Miller, supra note 120, at 104-05.
129. See supra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
130. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-3-104(a) to -3-112 (Michie 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42(a)-3104 to -3-112 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 490-3-104(a) to -3-112(b) (Supp. 1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-104(l) to -3-128 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. [U.C.C.] §§ 3-104(a) to 3-112
(1992); 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 3-104 to 3-112 (1991); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34.1-3-104 to -3-112 (1991).
131. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
132. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-3106(B) (Supp. 1993); CAL. COM. CODE § 3106(2) (West Supp.
1993) (the section is only effective until Jan. 1, 1995, so that there is time to review whether this is the
best approach); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.106(2) (West Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-306(I)
(West 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.3-106(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAW I § 3-106(2) (1992 & Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-3-106(2) (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 400.3-106(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.3106(2) (Michie Supp. 1991); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 12A:3-106(3) (West 1993); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-106(2) (McKinney 1991); OR. REV.
STAT. § 73.1060 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-106(2) (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.3106(2) (West Supp. 1993).
133. U.C.C. § 3-106(2) (Discussion Draft 1987).
134. California, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, and Washington add these words. See supra note 128
for the relevant citations.
135. See supra note 128.
136. See supra note 128.
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tive. The other six "non-uniform" states have relatively unique sections that
nonetheless guarantee negotiability to variable rate instruments.'
Twenty-seven states, therefore, have a statutory amendment that allows for the
outside determination of an interest rate in a negotiable instrument. This legislative
action recognizes the large extent to which financial institutions and their customers,
commercial and consumer, have accepted and utilized adjustable rate loan
documents. The nonuniformity of those statutes, however, presents a dilemma
which needs to be addressed. 3'
Since almost all of the state statutds were passed within the last four years,
another major problem emerges. Variable rates have been in use since the early
1980s. In the states that have statutory amendments, retroactivity becomes an
important question. Florida includes in its notes to the amendment that "the
Legislature intends to clarify and confirm existing laws."'39 It is abundantly clear,
therefore, that the Florida statute should be applied to any instrument, even those
entered into before the statute's passage. Other states do not provide for this clarity,
although it would have been wise to do so, and therefore three courts have been
forced to address this issue. In First City FederalSavings Bank v. Bhogaonker,'"
the court approached the issue by using the same reasoning as did the Florida
legislature. Without discussion of retroactivity, it simply held that the New York
Amendment clarified the law, rather than creating a different law. "' The New
Jersey Superior Court specifically addressed retroactivity of the statute, noting that
it is generally not favored."
However, it did recognize three exceptions; if
retroactivity was intended, if expectations would be enhanced, or if the statute was
ameliorative.'43 Since other state courts had ruled that variable rate notes were
non-negotiable, the New Jersey court found that "[t]he clear implication is that..
. the Legislature wanted to clarify New Jersey's position on the issue, before any
decisions were render.d. ' '" In contrast, a federal district court, applying Maryland
law, reached the opposite result using the same reasoning.'45 This court also
recognized that other states had found for non-negotiability, but denied that this
implied that the legislature was confirming state law. Instead, it found that "[i]t
is
likely that knowledge of case law interpreting similar provisions in other states
prompted the legislature to act so as to alter what it thought was the existing law
in Maryland."'" Indeed, the district court ruled that application of state law would

137. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 3-106(1)(f) (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.3106(1)(O (West
Supp. 1991); LA. REV. ST/AT. ANN. § 3-106(2) (West 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-03-06(i)(O, (g)
(1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-3-106(1)(O, (g) (1991); W. VA. CODE § 46-3-106(i)(f)-(h) (1991).
138. See infra notes 194-201 for further discussion of nonuniformity.
139. FL. STAT. ANN. § 673.106(2) historical note (West Supp. 1992).
140. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
142. Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, 606 A.2d 389, 397 (N.J. 1992).
143. Id. at 396-97.
144. Id. at 397. The court also found that the amendment enhanced the parties' expectations. 14i.
145. Chemical Bank v. D3J Assoc. Ltd Partnership, No. CIV.A.HAR-90-75, 1991 WL 58049, at
*3 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 1991).
146. Id. at *3.
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preclude negotiability of variable rate notes and declined to apply the statute
4
retroactively because of the lack of evidence of legislative intent to do so.
Because of the lack of uniformity, and the uncertainty surrounding retroactive
application of the amendments, state legislation has not sufficiently accomplished
the objective of encompassing variable rate instruments in the realm of negotiability.
Thus, the statutory law leaves conflicting and unresolved issues, similar to the case
law. The ramifications of the conflicting and uncertain state of the law are
significant on several levels.
V. Implications
The traditional significance of negotiable paper is that it is the first step to
obtaining the protected status of holder in due course. Only certain enumerated real
4
defenses are good against a holder in due course. The holder in due course is
immune to any other claim or defenses to payment. Thus, the negotiability of an
instrument generally obtains its significance when the paper has been transferred to
a third party, and the third party is claiming the status and protection of a holder in
due course. Within recent years, the holder in due course status has become
particularly important to the holder of a large amount of commercial paper - the
federal agencies handling insolvent financial institutions.
A. The FDICand Variable Interest Rates
During the 1980s and into the 1990s the failure of banks and savings institutions
49
skyrocketed. Record numbers of banks and thrifts became insolvent' and were
taken over by the appropriate federal agency. The result was a cost to taxpayers
estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars and the enactment of new legislation
s
that restructured the agencies overseeing the crisis." The Resolution Trust

147. Id. See also supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for further discussion of the case.
148. U.C.C. § 3-305 (1987). The section defines the real defenses as:
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders the
obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither
knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential
terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the instrument.
Id.; see also id. § 3-3-6 (listing rights when not a holder in due course).
149. In 1989, 206 banks failed. FEDERAL DEPOsIT INS. CORP., FDIC ANNUAL REPORT 1989, at 11
[hereinafter FDIC 1989 REPORT]. Between January 1, 1989, and March 30, 1990, the RTC took control
of 402 savings-and-loans. Maria Boss & Gary Watson, The FDIC's Special Defenses: Before & After
FIRREA, 29 AM. Bus. L. REv. 309, 310 (1991).
150. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 1833; see Boss & Watson, supra note 149, at 310-11. FIRREA abolished the Federal
Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, and transferred its duties to the RTC and FDIC. The RTC will
act as conservator or receiver for failed thrifts until August 9, 1992, at which time the FDIC will be
appointed in that capacity. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:257

Corporation and the FDIC'"' are presently the agencies that handle bank and thrift
failures, and their ability to efficiently process these institutional bankruptcies has
been hindered by the lack of clear negotiability for variable rate financial
instruments. In essence, the FDIC would like to claim holder in due course status
so that it, or its assigns, would not be liable for any defense, except the limited real
defenses.-The FDIC's ability to defeat the claims or defenses of a maker can be
based on several theories, one of which is the federal holder in due course.
Therefore, a brief discussion of these theories is warranted." 2
The power of the PDIC to collect payment of a debt owed to an insolvent bank
over the defense of t'he maker was first addressed in the case of D'Oench, Duhme,
53
and Co., Inc. v. FDIC.'
At the core of this case was the attempt of an insolvent
bank to fraudulently bolster the appearance of its assets by a sham agreement.
D'Oench, Duhme, and Co. signed a demand note payable to Belleville Bank and
Trust Co. in order to cover the fact that bonds issued to the banks were past due.
In the receipt for that note was the express statement that the notes would not be
repaid. This arrangement, however, allowed the bank to show the notes as an asset
without showing the bonds as a past due obligation. When the FDIC took over the
Belleville Bank it had no knowledge of the statement on the receipt. The FDIC
sought to enforce tha notes, but D'Oench, Duhme, and Co. defended the action
based on the statement on the face of the receipt.
The Supreme Court decided that because the case was based on a federal
question, federal common law should apply. It reviewed the provisions of the
Federal Reserve Act and stated that "these revisions reveal a federal policy to
protect respondent [FDIC], and the public funds which it administers, against
misrepresentations as to the securities or other assets.""M Based on this policy, the
Court denied the petitioners the ability to argue their defense based on a secret
agreement. The concurring opinion of Justice Jackson is also important. Justice
Jackson explained that the federal government has the power to develop common
law with regard to specific federal statutes, even though it has no general common
law. In applying this concept to the particular case, he noted that the FDIC's
creation was based upon the goal of restoring credibility to the banking industry.

151. For purposes of simplicity, in this article the FDIC will be used as the agency dealing with
bank and thrift failures, and the discussion applies to the RTC, as well.
152. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the powers of the FDIC in detail, For further,
more complete analysis, see generally Boss & Watson, supra note 149; Carol R. Goforth, Criticizing the
FinancialInstitution InsuranceAgencies' 'Super-Powers',22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195 (1990); W. Robert Gray,
Limitationson FDIC' D'Oench DoctrineofFederal Common-Law Estoppel: CongressionalPreemption
and Authoritative Statutoy Construction, 31 S. TEx. L.J. 245 (1990); Fred H. Miller & Scott A.
Meacham, The FDIC and Other FinancialInstitution Insurance Agencies as 'Super' Holders in Due
Course: A Lesson in Self-PollinatedJurisprudence,40 OKLA. L. REv. 621 (1987); Robert W. Norcross,
The Bank Insolvency Gami: FDICSuperpowers,the D'OenchDoctrine,and Federal Common Law, 103
BANKING L:J. 316 (1986); Stephen A. Weiss & Kenneth E. Kraus, D'Oench Protectionfor Private
InstitutionsAssisting the FDIC: A Necessary Component of the Thrift and Bank Bailout, 108 BANKING
L.J. 256 (1991).
153. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
154. Id. at 457.
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The goal could only be accomplished if the FDIC can rely on the face value of
banking paper and their representations. '
Following D'Oench, Congress passed section 1823(e) as part of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act of 1950.5' The section requires four elements to be present
in order to enforce an agreement which would be a defense against the FDIC.
These four requirements are.that the "agreement" be in writing, contemporaneous,
have been approved by the directors or loan committee of the bank, and have
continuously been a record of the bank.'"
Some courts have compared section 1823(e) protection to the holder in due
course under commercial law.' 5 Another view, however, is that this authority was
not granted to the FDIC under section 1823(e), but that the FDIC could obtain
protection similar to that of a holder in due course status by means of federal
common law.' 9 In Gunter v. Hutcheson,"" the court found that section 1823(e)
did not prevent noteholders from arguing the defense of fraud. Therefore, the court
followed a theory of federal common law to address the situation. It applied the
analysis in United States v. Kimbell Foods Inc.,' to determine federal common
law.
Kimbell Foods addressed the question of whether federal liens by the Small
Business Administration outweighed liens by other creditors. In deciding that the
state law of liens should apply, the court in Kimbell Foods used a two-step analysis.
First, it required that the question involved arise out of a federal program created
by Congress. Once achieving that step, the court balanced the question of whether
nationwide uniformity was required, whether specific objectives of the federal
program needed federal common law to be effective, and whether established state
law of commercial transactions created assumptions that should be protected. "2

155. Id. at 473.
156. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
157. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The section initially read:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the [FDIC]

Corporation in any asset required by it under this section, either as security for a loan or
by purchase, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement (1) shall be in
writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and the person or persons claiming an
adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition
of the asset by the bank, (3) shall have been approved by the board of directors of the
bank or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board
or committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an
official record of the bank.
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988). FIRREA amended the section to include the "receiver of any insured
depository institution." FIRREA, § 217(4), 103 Stat. at 256.
158. See, e.g., FDIC v. Rosenthal, 477 F. Supp. 1223, 1226, (E.D. Wis. 1979), affd mem., 631 F.2d
733 (7th Cir. 1980); FDIC v. Rockelman, 460 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
159. See FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
160. 674 F.2d 862, 867 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
161. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).

162. Id. at 727-29.
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The Gunter court applied the Kimbell Foods analysis, noting that the creation of
the FDIC was under federal statute, and proceeded to balance the other factors.'"
The court first explained methods available to the FDIC to take over failed banks.
Noting that the FDIC has a choice between paying outright the claims of customers
or arranging a purchase and assumption transaction, the court emphasized the
importance of the latter method of dealing with failed banks.'" Under the statutory
language, an FDIC may only enter into a purchase and assumption transaction when
it would lessen the liability of the entity or provide needed banking services to the
community.'" The Gunter court decided that it would be virtually impossible for
the FDIC to take the swift action necessary for determining liability and utilize a
purchase and assumption transaction if it were required to follow different state laws
and to individually assess the collectability of each asset." Thus, the court
decided to apply feceral common law and allow the FDIC, in a purchase and
assumption transaction, to take paper free of the defense of fraud. For the FDIC to
be able to defend against this defense it has to take the note "for value in good faith
and without actual knowledge of the fraud at the time the FDIC entered into the
purchase and assumption agreement." 7
Other cases have applied either an analysis to the holder in due course status in
state law, or called the FDIC a holder in due course by federal common law. The
case of FDIC v. Wood" distinguished between the state holder in due course
doctrine and the federal protection of the FDIC by describing the holder in due
course doctrine as the "bright line elaboration on the good faith requirement."'" 9
The court stated that "it is inappropriate to apply those [technical holder in due
course] requirements to a government agency crucial to the existence of the modern
banking system when they are without purpose."'' 0 The court indicated that
because the FDIC could act in good faith without meeting the strict requirements
of the holder in due course status, that due to the policy behind the FDIC, they
should be given the same protection. To do otherwise would interfere with the
purchase and assumption transaction which the Wood court called "a dramatically
effective way for the FDIC to fulfill its purpose.''
The court noted that this
policy should not be disruptive to state commercial law since the note in question
could have just as easily found its way into the hands of a holder in due course.
In Campbell Leasing v. FDIC,' decided in 1990, the court found that the FDIC
was immune to the defenses of tortious interference with leasing of an asset and

163. Gunter, 674 F.2o at 869.
164. Id. at 872.
165. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
166. Gunter, 674 F.26 at 869.
167. Id. at 873.
168. 758 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
169. Id. at 160.
170. Id.
171. Id.; see alo Langley v. FDIC. 484 U.S. 86 (1987) (interpreting § 1823(e) and reversing Wood
to the extent that fraud and misrepresentation are covered).
172. 901 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990).
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other personal defenses to liability. This analysis was based on the FDIC's status
as a holder in due course under federal common law. The court stated that "this rule
promotes the necessary uniformity of law in this area while it counters individual
state laws that would frustrate basic FDIC objectives."'" An analysis is necessary
to decide whether federal common law should apply to the specific question of the
negotiability of variable interest rate instruments. 74 The first consideration under
Kimbell Foods is whether a uniform federal rule is required. With regards to the
holder in due course, it has been argued that the Uniform Commercial Code, since
it is adopted in all states, provides such a uniform rule. However, the Uniform
Commercial Code is not standard in all states in deciding the effect of variable rates
on negotiability. Twenty-seven states have amended their statutes to include variable
interest rates as a sum certain, and it is likely that other states will soon follow
because of the proposed amendments circulating.'75 Thus, a uniform federal rule
is necessary because to hold otherwise "would frustrate attempts to promote the
stability of, and confidence in, the nation's banking system." 76 The second factor
enunciated in Kimbell Foods is whether the particular purpose of the federal
program would be frustrated without a federal uniform rule. The court noted that
the primary purpose of the FDIC is to ensure "depositors sound, effective, and
uninterrupted operation of the banking system with resulting safety and liquidity of
bank deposits."'"
Many courts have explained the benefits of using the purchase and assumption
transaction in order to accomplish the uninterrupted and efficient access to banking
services when a bank fails. Courts have noted that these purchase and assumption
transactions allow the FDIC to maintain the bank's goodwill and therefore recover
a greater amount of the bank's worth by selling its assets to a takeover bank."' In
contrast to liquidating a failed bank, the purchase and assumption transaction must
take place very quickly, literally overnight in some instances. Therefore, the FDIC
does not have the time to individually assess the assets of the failed bank."7 If it
were required to do so because of the non-negotiability of the instruments and their

173. Id. at 1249.
174. In 1991, the Fifth Circuit denied the FDIC holder in due course status, based on a variable
interest rate, which it found destroyed negotiability. Although the court recognized the need to protect
the FDIC, it would not allow it to "transmute lead into gold." The opinion was later withdrawn on
procedural grounds. Sunbelt Say. v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1991), withdrawn sub nom. RTC
v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Hershiser,777 F. Supp. at 542-43 (stating that
variable rates do not destroy negotiability for limited purpose of protecting banking system). See supra
notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
176. FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr., 766 F.2d 744, 748 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting FDIC v.
Rodenberg, 571 F. Supp. 455, 460 (D. Md. 1983)).
177. Campbell Leasing, 901 F.2d at 1248 (quoting S. REP. No. 1269, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1(1950),
reprintedin 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 3765, 3765-66).
178. See, e.g., Gilman v. FDIC, 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981). See generally Michael B. Burgee,
Purchase and Assumption Transactions Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14 FORUM 1146
(1979).
179. See, e.g., FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
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susceptibility to defenses, then the purchase and assumption transaction would not
be possible.'" In 1989, 84% of bank failures were the subject of purchase and
assumption transactions."' The FDIC estimated that over one hundred million
dollars was saved by arranging these purchase and assumption transactions, as
premiums paid by assuming banks amounted to forty million dollars."2 Thus, it
is evident that the purchase and assumption transaction is an efficient method for
the FDIC to handle a failed bank's assets, although it would be precluded if variable
rate instruments, representing a large percentage of a bank's assets, were held to be
non-negotiable.
The last factor in -determining whether a federal common law rule is needed is
whether commercial relationships would be upset at the state level by a federal rule.
The effect of a variable interest rate is not uniform throughout the states. In those
states where a variable rate interest is allowed as a sum certain, it obviously would
not disrupt any transactions. In states where the courts have decided that variable
rates do not meet the sum certain requirement, state commercial relationships may
be upset. However, the majority of states have statutes providing that variable
interest rates do not destroy negotiability. In those states without a statute, or with
contrary court decisions, the question remains as to whether ruling variable rate
interest instruments to be negotiable would alter the parties' expectations in the
transaction. Thus, by this analysis, the variable interest rate should not affect the
FDIC's federal holder in due course status. However, several federal courts have
already ruled to the contrary,"' while only one has ruled for negotiability.'
Therefore, variable interest rates continue to be a major problem for the FDIC.
B. Commercial Expectations and Cost
Commercial expectations are not only a consideration in applying federal
common law, but they should also be considered when deciding the basic question
of negotiability for adjustable rate notes.' The assumption may be that the parties
initially transacted based on the expectation that no holder in due course could exist
because of the instrument's variable interest rate and its non-negotiability. However,
this assumption may be false. Two empirical studies of the mortgage market were
undertaken after the court decisions denying negotiability in Illinois and New York,
in order to assess the impact of those decisions on interest rates." The premise
of these studies was that if variable interest rates were found to be non-negotiable,
then this could be tested in the market by following the interest rates on variable

180. Id. at 161.
181. See FDIC 1989 REPORT, supra note 149, at 12.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Sunbelt Say. v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 199 1), withdrawn sub non. RTC
v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1991); Doyle, 869 F.2d at 558; In re 1301 Connecticut Ave. Assoc.,
126 B.R. 823 (1991). See cupra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
184. See Hershiser,777 F. Supp. 539, 542-43. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
185. See Hiller & Fer-is, supra note 26, at 48.
186. See id. at 259; s e aLvo Janine S. Hiller & Stephen P. Ferris, An Analysis of the Impact of
Negotiability, 39 KAN. L. REV. 461 (1991).
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rate mortgages following the court decisions. If negotiability did not matter, that is,
if the parties were already negotiating on the premise that variable rate paper was
non-negotiable, then no change should be found in the interest rates following the
decisions. However, the opposite result was found in both of these studies. Interest
rates rose after the decisions in Illinois and New York. This reflects the fact that
negotiability and the ability to take paper as a holder in due course does in fact
represent a cost to the bank, which is passed on to the customer by means of a
higher interest rate. Most importantly, these studies show that the parties did not
consider their variable interest rate notes to be non-negotiable. If the court decision
merely reflected the parties understanding, then interest rates should have shown no
change. Because in both of these studies the interest rates increased after the court
decisions, it can be extrapolated that the parties did not consider variable rates to
destroy negotiability. Therefore, banks raised interest rates to reflect their increased
risk in issuing non-negotiable paper. Far from disrupting the commercial expectations of the parties, finding variable rate instruments to be negotiable would
reinforce the expectations of the parties. In addition, it would reflect the growing
trend to adopt an amendment to the UCC that specifically allows variable interest
rates in the sum certain requirement.
Additionally, the empirical studies show that there is a cost to business and
consumers, in higher interest rates, when variable rates are non-negotiable. Higher
interest rates in states where the variable rate instruments are non-negotiable result
in several implications for that community. First, higher interest rates affect
investment.' 7 Businesses must consider interest rates, a factor in the cost of
capital, when deciding whether to expand or to locate in a particular area.
Therefore, the higher interest rates caused by non-negotiability may be one factor
that could result in lower business investment in non-negotiability states.
Non-negotiability will also, very significantly and negatively, affect the residential
mortgage market. Mortgage rates will be higher when variable rate notes are
considered non-negotiable. At least two ramifications of higher mortgage rates exist.
First, consumers will be forced to buy less expensive houses, and marginal buyers
may be completely precluded from the home market. Secondly, the implication for
the construction industry is that it will not be as prosperous because of the effect
on homebuyers. The builder may actually feel the effect twice: once when faced
with higher rates at the bank himself and again when the market is narrowed
because of the effect on the buyer's ability to afford the home.
The non-negotiability of variable interest rate notes also affects the secondary
mortgage market, which is composed primarily of governmental, or quasigovernmental entities.' 8 The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
purchases and sells mortgage loans while acting as a clearinghouse for matching
supply and demand of mortgage funds. The Government National Mortgage

187. This argument assumes that the result,; of a study of commercial rates would parallel the studies
of residential mortgage rates.
188. See Hiller & Ferris, supra note 25, at 268-70, for a description of the secondary mortgage
market.
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Association (Ginnie Mae) promotes home ownership of low and middle income
houses by guaranteeing and packaging the loans in the secondary market. 9
Because of the large participation of these entities in the secondary market, it is
estimated that 80% of the forms used in residential closings are uniform." The
effect of non-negotiable variable rate paper was summarized in the amicus brief of
the pertinent federal agency submitted to the court in Taylor.
There is no practical degree of review in connection with loan purchases
that would provide the same safeguards as holder-in-due-course status.
The non-applicability of this status to adjustable rate loans would not
result in more policing of the primary market but rather in increasing
the yield requirements for those loans without the benefits of holder-indue-course status to compensate for their additional risk. '
Therefore, Ginnie Mae would not be able to guarantee as many low to middle
income home loans, and affordable housing would be restricted. Residential closing
forms could not be standard because of the different category of loans as negotiable
or non-negotiable. The costs to lenders and buyers in the secondary market would
increase because of the additional burden of determining the unclear distinction
between those notes that will or will not be negotiable. The negative effect of nonnegotiability of adjustable rate mortgages on the secondary market thus "seems
unquestionable."'"
The impact of non-negotiability on commercial expectations, as well as on costs
to consumer and businesses alike, are varied and far reaching. Variable rates are not
a temporary phenomeron, and those places where they are not negotiable can expect
a higher cost of capital resulting in less investment and a lesser ability to provide
affordable housing. The impact on the secondary residential mortgage market fuels
some of these costs and additionally inhibits their power to encourage standardized
and less costly forms for these transactions.
VI. Analysis and Recommendations
An analysis of the case law, legislation, and impact of non-negotiable adjustable
rate -documents is essential to reaching a recommendation of what, if anything,
should be done to address the issue. First of all, the court decisions are definitely
divided. However, a trend toward finding for the negotiability of variable interest
rate instruments is clearly emerging. An analysis of the rationale behind each side
of the issue supports the continuation of the trend.
The primary reasons given by the various courts for their rulings against
negotiability were: (1) the comment to section 3-106 clearly excepts current or bank
rates from a sum certain because of the reference to an outside source; (2)

189. Id. at 269-70.
190. Amicus Curiae Bref of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Taylor v. Roeder, 360 S.E.2d 191
(Va. 1987) (No. 840671).
191. Amicus Curiae Brief at 7,Taylor.
192. Id. at 5.
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uniformity and predictability; and (3) the weight of authority from other courts. A
closer look at these reasons reveals that, as time progresses, each one loses its basis
for validity. First, the revised article three allows for negotiability of adjustable
rates, as did the 1987 Discussion Draft. The comments in the Discussion Draft
indicated that the changes were in response to case law and "to make clear" that
these instruments are negotiable. 93 This implies that the drafters of the Code never
intended to exclude variable rates from a sum certain. Indeed, adjustable rates that
are familiar today were unknown when the Code was written. Second, uniformity
and predictability are presently in disarray. The changes in legislation, in piecemeal
progression, and the conflicting court decisions have already ended any possible
uniformity and predictability.'" The lack of uniformity also impacts the last
consideration, the weight of authority. Although more cases have followed the nonnegotiability rationale, the cases are duplicative, as they are from the same
jurisdiction, with several of these having been overturned. A poll of the jurisdictions
shows an even 6-6 split between the authority. The weight shifts in favor of
negotiability when one considers that one federal district court case decided the
outcome for two states, and that all other past federal district court decisions against
negotiability have been reversed. In addition, the recent trend is towards finding for
negotiability.
Those courts ruling in favor of negotiability have emphasized their reasons as: (1)
favoring flexibility as outlined in Code section 1-102; (2) the lack of a definition
of a sum certain; and (3) custom and usage that readily accepts variable interest
rates. All of these factors are reflected in the revised sections of the UCC. The sum
certain requirement is dropped, and the accepted custom of using adjustable rates
The flexibility of the
is clearly included within the negotiability framework.'
is
reaffirmed.
UCC to deal with developing practices
Twenty-seven states have adopted an amendment that provides for the negotiability of variable interest rate instruments. However, only six states have adopted the
uniform amendment." The legislative route of addressing adjustable rate paper,
which could have solved the problem of nonuniformity, has instead added to the
dilemma. Many of the states patterned their amendments after the 1987 Discussion
Draft proposed by the Commissioners.' " The final proposal was significantly
different from the 1987 version. Thus, instead of beginning the process towards
uniformity with states already in agreement, the Commissioners began with a
deficit. States that already debated and analyzed the problem, and agreed with the
first draft, must now be convinced that the final proposal is better. The lack of a
"readily ascertainable" standard for determining the interest rate is likely to provoke
8
debate. An unpublished rate may increase the transaction costs of a third party'
193. U.C.C. § 3-106 cmt. (Discussion Draft 1987).
194. See Robert G. Ballen et al., Commercial Paper,Bank Deposits and Collections, and Other
Payment Systems, 44 Bus. LAw. 1515, 1552 (1989) (stating that "we are doomed to a period of nonuniformity").
195. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 128.
197. See supra note 129.
198. See Frank P. Darr, The Negotiability of Variable InterestNotes, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 103, 131
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and therefore decrease the transferability of the paper. On the other hand, it is very
clear, and thus predictable, that if the principle amount of debt is stated, then the
interest calculation will not destroy negotiability. Thus, litigation costs will
decrease, because there will be no doubt as to whether the calculation is readily
ascertainable or fits the definition of the discussion draft.Y The Commissioners
must have believed that the benefits of the final draft outweighed the head start they
would have achieved by staying with a discussion draft already adopted by
numerous states. It is now imperative for them to pursue uniformity on this issue
and to once again convince those states of the necessity of change.
If the Commissioners do not succeed in achieving uniformity, then an argument
can be made that federal legislative action is necessary. This argument is made with
due trepidation, because commercial law has traditionally been the province of the
states. The Commissioners' work on the revised articles 3 and 4 of the UCC is at
least in part because of a desire to maintain commercial rules within the bounds of
state lawY Without delving into the intricacies of federal jurisdiction, a preliminary case can be made for federal intervention.20 ' The banking industry is already
highly regulated by the federal government, the secondary market for commercial
paper is dominated by quasi-governmental agencies, and efficient, effective
interstate and international commerce is dependent upon uniform rules of
negotiability and commercial paper. If the states cannot arrive at a consensus, then
the United States Congress should consider providing the necessary uniformity by
federal statute to avoid further disruption of'commerce and commercial relationships. While awaiting state action, federal common law should be interpreted to
include variable interest rates as a sum certain, so that the FDIC can continue to
utilize the most cost-effective method of handling failed financial institutions and
maintaining public confidence.
VII. Conclusion
The issue of adjustable rates and the requirement of a sum certain for negotiability was slow to be recognized but is now building to a critical point. The lack of
uniformity in case law and statutes has had a costly effect on businesses, consumers,
the government, and on all of us as taxpayers. It is time for the end of a rigid
application of negotiability rules to variable rate instruments, and time to work
towards the essential uniformity that is the only solution to an ever-increasing
problem.

(1988).
199. See Miller, supre note 116, at 104-05.
200. Id. at 120-21.
201. This is based on the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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